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Abstract 
In April of 2008 the United States ratified the UNESCO International Convention against 
Doping in Sport. The Convention addresses national and international level activities, education 
and research, and monitoring related to doping. The ratification raised questions about the 
potential impact on sport entities in the United States because the Convention directs member 
nations to take steps, including legislative, to combat doping. However, since ratification the 
United States’ compliance level with the Convention had remained unchanged at 78.6% until 
2015, when it increased to 89.3%. The past lower overall compliance was due to low compliance 
levels in several categories, including: Financial Measures; Professional Codes of Conduct; 
Nature of Research; and Sport Science. All of these areas are dealt with by private entities in the 
United States and the government takes little to no active role. Due to constitutional concerns, 
the government is unlikely to get involved in these areas in the future, thus depending on 
improvements by private entities, leaving the United States unable to fully comply with the 
Convention.  
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I. Introduction 
Nearly a decade ago, on April 4th, 2008, the United States became the 90th signatory1 to 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) International 
Convention against Doping in Sport (Convention).2 The signing of this treaty came on the heels 
of the Mitchell Report on doping in Major League Baseball, which was released in December of 
2007.3 Sports doping was a common item in the news, professional athletes were being called 
before Congress, and there was a general notion that sports throughout the United States were 
“dirty.” The potential consequences of the United States signing the Convention were varied and 
far-reaching, but since the United States signed the Convention, it does not appear that much has 
been done to specifically enact the treaty.  
This article examines the Convention, its implications, and implementation – or lack 
thereof. The first section will provide an overview of the Convention: its purpose, contents, and 
its methods. The second section will examine which United States organizations the Convention 
may apply to, and what their legal standing was prior to the ratification of the Convention. The 
third section will examine the legal ramifications for the effected sport organizations and provide 
recommendations on how sport organizations can adapt to the Convention. The fourth section 
will discuss United States’ compliance with the Convention. 
                                                 
* Associate Professor in the Sport Management Department, SUNY Cortland; Ph.D. candidate in Sport 
Administration, University of New Mexico; M.S., New York University; J.D., Marquette University Law School; 
B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
** Assistant Professor in the School of Administrative Sciences Administration, Fairleigh Dickinson University; 
Ph.D., University of New Mexico; M.S., University of New Haven; B.S., Rutgers University.  
1 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, United States Ratifies International Convention 
against Doping in Sport, located at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=43227&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.  (Last accessed September 10, 2015).  
[Hereinafter UNESCO.]  
2 International Convention against Doping in Sport 2005, located at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=31037&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.  (Last accessed September 10, 2015.)  
[Hereinafter Convention.] 
3 George J. Mitchell, Report to the Commissioner of Baseball of an Independent Investigation into the Illegal Use of 
Steroids and other Performance Enhancing Substances by Players in Major League Baseball, 2007, located at 
http://files.mlb.com/mitchrpt.pdf. (Last accessed September 10, 2015). [Hereinafter Mitchell Report.]  
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II. The Convention 
A. Purpose and Execution 
The Convention’s purpose “is to promote the prevention of and the fight against doping 
in sport, with a view to its elimination.”4 Several means of achieving this purpose are spelled out 
in the Convention, including that the parties to the Convention “adopt appropriate measures at 
the national and international levels which are consistent with the principles of the Code.”5 These 
measures may include “legislation, regulation[s], policies or administrative practices.”6 Finally, 
the Convention directs that the signatory nations “commit themselves to the principles of the 
[World Anti-Doping] Code as the basis for the[se] measures.”7 
B. National-level Activities 
 Article 7 of the Convention permits governments to rely on national anti-doping and 
sport organizations to carry out the purposes of the Convention.8 Sanctions against athletic 
support personnel, such as athletic trainers and doctors,9 and regulations of nutritional 
supplements are both encouraged.10 
 One of the Convention’s primary foci for national action is the restriction of the 
availability and use of doping aids and methods.11 It encourages both governments and sport 
organizations to adopt measures that restrict the availability, possession, and use of prohibited 
substances, although it specifically allows for exemptions for therapeutic use.12 Suggested 
measures to curb doping by athletes include: “no-advance notice, out-of-competition and in-
                                                 
4 Convention, supra note 2, at Art. 1. 
5 Id. at Art. 3(a). 
6 Id. at Art. 5.  
7 Id. at Art. 4(1). 
8 Id. at Art. 7. 
9 Convention, supra note 2, at Art. 9. 
10 Id. at Art. 10.  
11 Id. at Art. 8, 
12 Id. at Art. 8(1-3). 
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competition testing;”13 allowing sport organizations to permit “their members to be tested by 
duly authorized doping control teams from other countries;”14 and assisting sport and anti-doping 
organization with “gaining access to an accredited doping control laboratory.”15  
 The Convention also provides for financial methods that countries can use to exert 
control over sports doping. It states the parties shall “provide funding…to support a national 
testing programme…or assist…in financing doping controls either by direct subsidies or 
grant.”16 It further directs governments to withhold funding from both athletes and athletic 
support personnel during a suspension due to a doping violation,17 as well as from any sport 
organization “not in compliance with the Code.”18 
C. International Activities 
 The third section of the Convention focuses on international cooperation as a means to 
control and eliminate doping. It encourages cooperation between governments, anti-doping 
agencies, and sport organizations around the world.19 This cooperation includes: allowing in- and 
out-of-competition testing of athletes in their own and other territories;20 allowing movement of 
doping control teams and samples across borders;21 and recognize other members’ doping-
control procedures and support reciprocal testing arrangements.22 Parties are also encouraged to 
                                                 
13 Id. at Art. 12(a). 
14 Convention, supra note 2, at Art. 12(b).  
15 Id. at Art. 12(c). 
16 Id. at Art. 11(a). 
17 Id. at Art. 11(b). 
18 Id. at Art. 11(c).  
19 Convention, supra note 2, at art. 13. 
20 Id. at Art. 16(a). 
21 Id. at Art. 16(b-c). 
22 Id. at Art. 16(f-g). 
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share information on effective anti-doping programs23 and anti-doping research and 
developments.24 
Parties are also directed to support the mission of the World Anti-Doping Agency 
(WADA)25 and to provide equal funding of WADA via both public sources and the Olympic 
movement.26 However, the more detailed section on funding addresses the voluntary fund, which 
governments and sport organizations can donate to as they chose.27  
D. Education and Research 
 Two other areas of focus for the Convention are education and research related to doping. 
Parties are directed to “support, devise or implement education and training programmes on anti-
doping”28 for athletes, athletics support personnel, and the sports community in general.29 The 
purpose of this education is to inform people of the health risks30 and ethical issues31 doping 
raises, as well as the specifics of the Code,32 what substances are prohibited,33 and doping control 
procedures.34  
 Section V of the Convention focuses on doping research, both what kinds of research 
should be conducted and how that research should be carried out. Research on training 
programs,35 emerging doping substances and methods36 and prevention, and new detection 
                                                 
23 Id. at Art. 23. 
24 Convention, supra note 2, at Art. 26. 
25 Id. at Art. 14; WADA was created in 1999 and states its mission “mission is to lead a collaborative worldwide 
movement for doping-free sport.” World Anti-Doping Agency, located at https://www.wada-ama.org/en/who-we-
are. (Last accessed April 8, 2016.)  
26 Id. at Art. 15. 
27 Id. at Art.17-18. 
28 Id. at Art. 19(1). 
29 Convention, supra note 2, at Art. 19(1-2). 
30 Id. at Art. 19(1)(b). 
31 Id. at Art. 19(1)(a). 
32 Id. at Art. 19(2)(b). 
33 Id. at Art. 19(2)(c). 
34 Convention, supra note 2, at Art. 19(2)(a). 
35 Id. at Art. 24(b). 
36 Id. at Art. 24(c). 
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methods and health issues37 are all encouraged. Such research should be carried out in lawful and 
ethical ways and should avoid administering athletes prohibited substances.38 Research should 
also be performed “only with adequate precautions in place to prevent the results [from] being 
misused and applied for doping.”39 
E. Monitoring 
 In order to monitor the Convention, the Conference of Parties was created.40 It meets 
biannually and every signatory nation is a member with one vote.41 The functions of the 
Conference of Parties are many, designed to carry out several purposes: to promote the 
Convention and its purpose;42 to address funding issues;43 to receive reports and monitor 
compliance with the Convention;44 and to examine and approve changes to the list of prohibited 
substances and to the Convention itself.45 
III. Current Legal Standing of Affected Organizations 
 Nowhere does the Convention state what particular sport organizations are, or should be, 
bound by the Convention’s terms. Although there is reference to the Olympic movement, the 
Convention is not limited to National Olympic Committees or their member sport governing 
bodies. This means that the Convention could have an impact on all sport organizations in the 
United States, both professional and amateur.  
All of the sports organizations that could be effected by the Convention are considered 
private entities at this time. Private entities are not subject to constitutional constraints when “the 
                                                 
37 Id. at Art. 24(a) 
38 Id. at Art. 25(a-b). 
39 Convention, supra note 2, at Art. 25(c). 
40 Id. at Art. 28(1). 
41 Id. at Art. 28(2-3). 
42 Id. at Art. 30(1)(a). 
43 Id. at Art. 30(b-c). 
44 Convention, supra note 2, at Art. 30(d-e, h-i). 
45 Id. at Art. 30(f-g). 
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practices [can] not be shown to be approved, encouraged, or even influenced by the state as a 
consequence of state licensure, regulation, or funding.46 This means that they are not obligated to 
grant constitutional protections to their members, employees, or participants.   
A. United States Anti-Doping Agency 
The United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) was created in 2000 to address “gross 
shortcomings” in the United States Olympic Committee’s (USOC) drug testing program.47 With 
the support of the USOC, Congress worked with the Office of National Drug Control Police 
(ONDCP) to create USADA.48 
 USADA is a private, non-profit organization “that undertakes its duties pursuant to 
contract with the USOC to administer the United States’ drug testing programs.”49 USADA has 
the authority to test: 
a.   Any athlete who is a member of a NGB [National Governing Body];  
b.   Any athlete participating at a competition sanctioned by the USOC or a NGB;  
c.   Any foreign athlete who is present in the United States; or 
d.   Any other athlete who has given his/her consent to testing by USADA or who 
has submitted an out-of-competition testing location form to USADA or an IF 
[International Federation] within the previous twelve months and has not 
given his or her NGB and USADA written notice of retirement; 
e.   Any athlete who has been named by the USOC or an NGB to an international 
team or who is included in the USADA Registered Testing Pool or is 
competing in a qualifying event to represent the USOC or NGB in 
international competition; 
f.   Any United States athlete or foreign athlete present in the United States who is 
serving a period of ineligibility on account of an anti-doping rule violation and 
who has not given prior written notice of retirement from all sanctioned 
                                                 
46 Steven Siegel, The Constitution and Private Government: Toward the Recognition of Constitutional Rights in 
Private Residential Communities Fifty Years after March v. Alabama, 6 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 461, 515 
(1998). 
47 Dionne L. Koller, Health Law Symposium: Does the Constitution Apply to the Actions of the United States Anti-
Doping Agency?, 50 ST. LOUIS L.J. 91, 105 (2005).  This article provides a thorough and detailed analysis of whether 
USADA would be deemed a state actor by a court and concludes that, although there are specific circumstances 
where USADA’s actions may be deemed as acting on behalf of the state, in general USADA is not a government 
entity and cannot be deemed a state actor. The article makes no references to whether USADA could be considered 
a government agent however.  
48 Id. at 95-96, 106. 
49 Id. at 108. 
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competition to the applicable NGB and USADA, or the applicable foreign 
anti-doping agency or foreign sport association.50 
 
This is a very broad mandate that allows USADA to test all United States athletes that are 
involved in Olympic sports, as well as all Olympic foreign athletes when they are on United 
States soil. 
 This testing is carried out both in- and out-of-competition, either with advance notice or 
no notice. 51 Both blood and urine testing occurs and samples are sent to WADA-approved 
laboratories.52 Additionally, USADA is to maintain “a searchable database which includes the 
identity of all Athletes tested by USADA under its Olympic, Paralympic, Pan American, Parapan 
American and Youth Olympic movements Testing program and the number of times each 
Athlete has been tested by USADA.”53 However, USADA is no to comment on any athlete’s 
results until the athlete has gone through or waived the hearing process and been found to have 
committed a doping offense.54 
B.  United States Olympic Committee 
The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) was created through federal 
legislation55 and has also been deemed a private entity.56   
The fact ‘that a private entity performs a function which serves the public 
does not make its acts [governmental] action.’  The Amateur Sports Act was 
enacted ‘to correct the disorganization and the serious factional disputes that 
seemed to plague amateur sports in the United States.’  The Act merely authorized 
the USOC to coordinate activities that always have been performed by private 
entities.  Neither the conduct nor the coordination of amateur sports has been a 
traditional governmental function. 57 
 
                                                 
50 USADA, Protocol for Olympic Movement Testing, 1-2 (2014). [Hereinafter Olympic Testing Protocol.] 
51 Id. at 6. 
52 Id. at 8. 
53 Id. at 18. 
54 Id. 
55 Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. §§220501-220529 (1994).  [Hereinafter 36 U.S.C.] 
56 San Francisco Arts and Athl., Inc. v. U.S.O.C., 483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
57 Id. at 543-546. 
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 The purposes of the USOC are “to obtain for the United States… the most competent 
amateur representation possible in each event of the Olympic Games, the Paralympic Games, 
and Pan-American Games”58 and to oversee “all matters pertaining to United States participation 
in the [those games], including representation of the United States in the games.”59 The USOC is 
not directly involved in the administration of doping policies or testing regimens, however the 
USOC communicates closely with USADA and the outcome of doping cases effects the USOC’s 
eligibility and selection of athletes.  
C. National Collegiate Athletic Association 
 Numerous courts have found the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) to be 
a private organization.60 The NCAA has several primary purposes, including:  
(a) To initiate, stimulate and improve intercollegiate athletics programs for student-
athletes and to promote and develop educational leadership, physical fitness, athletics 
excellence and athletics participation as a recreational pursuit;… 
(c) To encourage its members to adopt eligibility rules to comply with satisfactory 
standards of scholarship, sportsmanship and amateurism; 
(f ) To supervise the conduct of, and to establish eligibility standards for, regional and 
national athletics events under the auspices of this Association; 
(g) To cooperate with other amateur athletics organizations in promoting and conducting 
national and international athletics events; 
(h) To legislate, through bylaws or by resolutions of a Convention, upon any subject of 
general concern to the members related to the administration of intercollegiate athletics; 
and 
(i) To study in general all phases of competitive intercollegiate athletics and establish 
standards whereby the colleges and universities of the United States can maintain their 
athletic programs on a high level.…61 
 
                                                 
58 36 U.S.C., supra note 55, at §§220503(4) 
59 Id. at §220503(3)(A) 
60 See e.g. Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021 (4th Cir. 1984) (NCAA is "a voluntary association of public 
and private institutions"); O'Halloran v. Univ. of Wash. 679 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (W.D.Wash. 1988), revd. on other 
grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (NCAA is private entity); Hill v. NCAA,  865 P.2d 633  (1994), stating that “the NCAA as 
a private organization, comprised of American colleges and universities, and democratically governed by its own 
membership”; and NCAA. v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 197 (1998) (NCAA is private actor that "enjoy[s] no 
governmental powers"). 
61 NCAA 2015-2016 Division I Manual, art. 1.2 (2015). [Hereinafter NCAA Manual.] 
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 Several of these purposes could be interpreted as applicable to doping in collegiate sports. 
The NCAA appears to believe that regulating doping is within the purview of its purposes, 
otherwise it would not have created a drug-testing policy in 1986.62 The purpose of this policy is 
to prevent any participant from having “an artificially induced advantage” and from being 
“pressured to use chemical substances in order to remain competitive,” as well as “to safeguard 
the health and safety of participants.”63 The NCAA drug tests student-athletes independently of 
the schools at NCAA events such as tournaments and championships at all levels, as well as 
year-round for Divisions I and II.64 
D. Professional Sports Leagues 
 All professional sports leagues in the United States are private businesses. The teams are 
owned by private individuals or organizations and the leagues are private, members-only clubs 
that cooperate to create a product, the professional sports league and its respective games. Courts 
have supported the contention that professional sports leagues (and their member teams) are 
private entities.65 Thus, the regulation of doping is achieved through agreements with each 
league’s respective union.66 The National Football League, National Hockey League, Major 
League Baseball, and National Basketball Association all have agreements with their respective 
unions, however, none of those agreements specifically agreed to abide by WADA or the 
                                                 
62 NCAA 2014-2015 Drug-Testing Program, Chap. IV (2014). [Hereinafter NCAA Drug-Testing Policy.] 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at Chap. IV, art. 4. 
65 See generally Oakland Raiders, Inc. v. National Football League, 131 Cal. App. 4th 621 (2005). 
66 See generally NFL/NFLPA Drug Policies (2015), located at https://www.nflpa.com/active-players/drug-policies; 
NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. XXXIII (2011), located at http://nbpa.com/cba/; MLB/MLBPA Joint 
Drug Agreement (2011), located at http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/cba.jsp; NHL/NHLPA Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, Art. 47 (2012), located at http://www.nhlpa.com/inside-nhlpa/collective-bargaining-agreement. (All last 
accessed September 10, 2015.) 
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Convention and are unlikely to do so in the future, as the leagues find the penalties required by 
WADA too extreme.67  
IV. Implications of the Convention 
 The Convention is a treaty. The process the Convention went through for Senate 
ratification proves its treaty status. The Constitution states “all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land.”68 An 
issue of contention among legal theorists has been whether the power and authority of treaties is 
greater, lesser, or equal to that of federal legislation.   
 Some argue that treaties are not bound by even the limits of the Constitution,69 although 
the Supreme Court has put this idea to rest.70 Another perspective is that treaties do not have 
power in and of themselves, and unless domestic law is enacted to support their terms, American 
citizens, businesses and organizations can essentially ignore treaties.71  
 If treaties have no power until federal legislation is passed to enact them, then the effect 
of the Convention is nil until such legislation is passed. However, if treaties have power on their 
own or federal legislation is enacted to make the Convention the federal law of the land, then the 
impact of the Convention could be broad reaching for professional and amateur sport 
organizations across the United States. Thus far no specific legislation has been enacted and 
UNESCO reported that enacting legislation is the primary way that signatories comply with the 
                                                 
67 Why the National Football League Will Never Agree to Steroid Testing by USADA, (n.d.), located at 
https://www.steroid.com/blog/Why-the-National-Football-League-Will-Never-Agree-to-Steroid-Testing-by-
USADA.php. (Last accessed October 6, 2015.) 
68 U.S. Const. art. VI, §2.  
69 John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1965, 1967, (1999). 
70 Id. at 1966. 
71 Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Response: Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2155 (1999). 
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Convention, with 63 countries reporting such enactments in 2013.72 It appears the United States 
never intended to enact any such legislation, as in May of 2008, just after the ratification of the 
Convention, Joan Donoghue, the principle deputy legal advisor for the State Department testified 
before Congress that  
[t]he Convention is not structured to secure changes to national law or regulation, but 
rather to secure commitments by parties to promote international collaboration, research, 
education, and their own national efforts and awareness of anti-doping control efforts. In 
other words, no new legislation will be required to implement this Convention.73 
 
A. Transformation in to a State Actor or Government Agent 
 Prior to the signing of the Convention, there was no federal legislation regarding doping 
in sports, professional or amateur. Whether the treaty serves as federal legislation or federal 
legislation is enacted because of the treaty, the result will be the same: the United States 
government will have mandated policies, procedures and methods for detecting doping in sport 
organizations.  
Federal legislation that mandates the drug-testing policies and procedures of sport 
organizations could have the effect of turning those sport organizations into state actors or 
government agents, at least in regard to their drug-testing of athletes. However, becoming a state 
actor or government agent would mean that those sport organizations would have to grant the 
athletes they test constitutional protections.   
The concepts of state actor and government agent are closely related, however, the 
criteria for each are different, with the tests for being a state actor being more stringent then 
those making an entity a government agent. Under tests for either of these, will the Convention, 
                                                 
72 Reports of States Parties on Measures Taken by Them for the Purpose of Complying with the International 
Convention against Doping in Sport (2013), located at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002227/222725e.pdf. 
(Last accessed September 10, 2015.) [Hereinafter 4CP Report of Parties.] 
73 Donoghue, Joan. Written Testimony to the Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. On the International 
Convention Against Doping in Sport. Submitted May 22, 2008. Available at: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/138877.pdf; Accessed: 11/3/16.  
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either through its own power as a treaty, or through legislation enacted at its direction, cause 
sport organizations to become either state actors or government agents?  
1. State Actor 
 Four different tests have been created to determine whether a private organization should 
be considered a state actor for some purpose. These tests include: 1) the public function test; 2) 
the state compulsion test; 3) the entwinement test; and 4) the close nexus or symbiotic 
relationship test.74  
a. Public Function Test 
The public function test was created by the Supreme Court in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn.75 
The purpose is to determine whether the function being performed by the private entity “has 
been ‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.’”76 Since drug-testing and anti-doping 
measures in sport, much less the general governance of sport, have never been a function carried 
out by the government, this test fails to make sport organizations state actors. 
b. State Compulsion Test 
The state compulsion test examines whether the state “exercised coercive power 
or…provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law 
be deemed to be that of the State”,77 not of the private party. Thus, whether the private party is a 
state actor depends on a totality of the elements involved.78 The elements thus far are only that 
the ratification resulted in sport organizations being required to do something – drug-testing – 
that they already do. The only change to the drug-testing would be that the procedures, methods 
                                                 
74 Bradley T. French, Comment: Charter Schools: Are For-Profit Companies Contracting for State Actor Status?, 83 
U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 251,  263 (2006). 
75 457 U.S. 830 (1982). 
76 FRENCH, supra note 73, at 263, citing Id. at 842. 
77 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). 
78 FRENCH, supra note 73, at 264.  
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and banned substances would be uniform among all sport organizations, something that is not 
that case now. However, the mere ratification of the Convention is insufficient to say that the 
state has compelled sport organizations to perform drug-testing is any specific, state-compelled 
way. Short of specific federal legislation regarding testing methods and banned substances, it is 
unlikely that this test can be met. 
c. Entwinement Test 
The entwinement test, developed in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School 
Athletic Ass'n,79 is the newest test. In this test, a private party is determined to be a state actor 
when the “nominally private character of the association is overborne by the pervasive 
entwinement of public institutions and public officials in its composition and workings, and there 
is no substantial reason to claim unfairness in applying constitutional standards to it.”80   
Since the Convention, and any subsequent federal legislation that may result from it, will 
create federal standards for drug-testing procedures and methods, as well as uniform banned 
substance lists, it is reasonable to conclude that this may be sufficient to constitute entwinement. 
Furthermore, the government may chose to have the ONDCP, or some other government agency, 
monitor the compliance of sport organizations with the federal standards. This would further 
support the contention that the private sport organizations and the government are so entwined as 
to deem the sport organizations’ drug-testing policies to be state action. As long as such 
legislation does not exist, this test is not met.  
d. Close Nexus or Symbiotic Relationship Test 
The close nexus, or symbiotic relationship test, is basically a combination of the 
preceding three tests. All components of those three tests are taken into consideration in order to 
                                                 
79 Brentwood Academy v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athl. Ass’n, 531 U.S. 228 (2001). 
80 Id. at 298. 
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determine whether the relationship between the private entity and the state is such that the 
regulation of the private entity is “so pervasive as to hold that the entity has functionally 
‘merged’ with the state.”81 Since the ratification of the Convention, and passage of any 
subsequent legislation, does not amount to making sport organizations state actors under all three 
of the previous tests, the close nexus test cannot be satisfied.  
2. Government Agent 
A single, more subjective test is used to determine whether a private party is a 
government agent. It examines “the degree of the Government’s participation in the private 
party’s activities.”82 The test tends to lean toward making a private entity a government agent 
because the goal is to protect the rights of the individual. “Constitutional provisions for the 
security of person and property are to be liberally construed, and ‘it is the duty of courts to be 
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments 
thereon’.”83   
When federal laws that mandate that private organization to perform some action, 
regardless of whether that organization would or would not perform that action without such a 
mandate, the private organization is transformed into a state actor when performing the mandated 
action, especially if protected interests and rights of individuals are involved. A law that restricts 
a private organization’s ability to create its own rules and regulations is evidence of government 
encouragement, endorsement, and/or participation in the business of the organization.84 This can 
even apply to organizations whose employees are unionized, such as professional sports leagues, 
if the federal law is “intended to supersede ‘any provision of a collective bargaining 
                                                 
81 FRENCH, supra note 74, at 265. 
82 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989). 
83 Byars v. U.S., 273 U.S. 28, 32 (1927), citing Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). 
84 Skinner, supra note 82, at 615-616. 
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agreement.’”85 Thus, a private organization is considered a government agent if it is merely 
performing an action in place of the government or at the government’s direction. 
All sport organizations could be found to be government agents, but only with additional 
Congressional action. Whether the Convention as a treaty has the effect of federal law or actual 
federal legislation is passed to enact the Convention, the federal government has chosen to 
mandate the drug-testing policies of both professional and amateur sport organizations. 
However, the specifics of that mandate are insufficient as they currently exist to trigger 
government agent standing. In the eight plus years since the Convention was ratified, the private 
sport entities in the United States are still not considered government agents and it is improbable 
that this will change in the future. 
If this status were to change, and all sport organizations were be found to be either a state 
actor or a government agent when implementing the Convention, they would all have to provide 
their members and employees constitutional protections. This is likely a factor that has 
influenced why the United States has failed to pass any legislation forwarding the purposes of 
the Convention. 
B. Constitutional Implications 
 There are several implications regarding constitutional rights that sport organizations 
would have to abide by as state actors/governments agents. The primary constitutional concern 
regarding drug-testing is the Fourth Amendment regarding unlawful searches and seizures.86 
Other constitutional concerns involve privacy issues, as well as the Fifth Amendment and other 
criminal issues. 
 
                                                 
85Id. at 615. 
86 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
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1. Fourth Amendment 
 The Supreme Court has found that obtainment of bodily fluids is a seizure and thus, 
limited by the Fourth Amendment. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn.87 concluded that 
urine testing “intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as 
reasonable.”88 Schmerber v. California89 held that a blood test “plainly involves the broadly 
conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”90   
 Since drug tests involve urine samples, blood samples, or both, organizations that want to 
drug test their members or employees need to either abide by constitutional criteria or be exempt. 
As private entities, sport organizations are exempt and do not have to grant their athletes or other 
employees constitutional protections. However, if implementation of the Convention converted 
United States sport organizations to state actors and/or government agents, than they would have 
to abide by constitutional protections.  
 This would bring the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC), the drug-testing code adopted 
by the Convention, into direct conflict with the United States Constitution. The Convention 
simply states that parties shall “adopt appropriate measures…consistent with the principles of the 
Code”91 and that these measures include “no-advance notice” tests.92 However, under the Fourth 
Amendment, a search and seizure is only lawful when a warrant has been issued “upon probable 
cause, supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and…describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized”.93   
                                                 
87 See generally SKINNER, supra note 82. 
88 Id. at 617. 
89 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). 
90 Id.  
91 Convention, supra note 2, at Art. 3(a). 
92 Id. at Art. 12(a). 
93 U.S. Const., supra note 86, at amend. IV. 
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An athlete who has never tested positive for a banned substance or has not been in any 
way implicated in the use of a banned substance cannot be lawfully tested under the Fourth 
Amendment. A warrant for the urine and/or blood for these individuals would not be granted 
because there is no probable cause to believe that these athletes have committed a doping 
violation. No legislation can override the Fourth Amendment, and thus, the Fourth Amendment 
appears to prevent the government from fully enacting the Convention. 
2. Privacy Concerns 
 Although not specifically granted in the Constitution, the Supreme Court recognizes that 
“the Bill of Rights have penumbras extending beyond their specific terms to create a ‘zone of 
privacy.’”94 This “right to privacy is the right to restrict disclosure of personal information 
without an individual's consent.”95 However, the WADC does not have such a policy.   
The identity of Athletes whose Samples have resulted in Adverse Analytical Findings, or 
other Persons who were alleged by an Anti-Doping Organization to have violated other 
anti-doping rules, may be publicly disclosed by the Anti-Doping Organization with 
results management responsibility no earlier then completion of the administrative review 
described in Article 7.1 and 7.2.  No later then twenty days after it has been determined in 
a hearing in accordance with Article 8 that an anti-doping rule violation has occurred, or 
such hearing has been waived, or the assertion of an anti-doping rule violation has not 
been timely challenged, the Anti-Doping Organization responsible for results 
management must publicly report the disposition of the anti-doping matter. [Emphasis 
omitted.]96 
 
Since USADA would be the Anti-Doping Organization charged with results 
management, USADA would be obligated to disclose athletes’ private drug-testing results, in 
violation of the United States Constitution. Under these circumstances, USADA is not capable of 
abiding by the Constitution and by the Convention, and since the Constitution has supremacy 
over treaties and federal legislation, USADA would have to abide by the Constitutional 
                                                 
94 Deanne L. Ayers, Random Urinalysis: Violating the Athlete's Individual Rights?, 30 HOW. L.J. 93, 120 (1987). 
95 Id.  
96 World Anti-Doping Code, at Art. 14.2, located at http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/code_v3.pdf.  
[Hereinafter WADC.] 
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protections and thus, could not disclose athletes’ test results without their consent. USADA gets 
around this as a private entity by requiring that all athletes agree to the doping protocols, which 
include criteria for releasing an athletes name and doping violation.97 Although as a government 
agent or actor, USADA could still ask athletes to waive certain rights, the enforceability of such 
waivers would be suspect.  
3. Criminal Concerns 
 There is a potential that criminal charges and punishments could be attached to doping 
offences by athletes. This raises several constitutional concerns. The first is the Fifth 
Amendment, which protects people from being “compelled…to be a witness against himself.”98 
If an athlete is forced to submit to drug-testing and the results of that test can be used against 
them in a court of law, even if the test is performed with a warrant, then all athletes are being 
compelled to provide evidence against themselves in a criminal matter and this may very well be 
in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Currently, the United States government does not use 
positive doping results to bring criminal charges against athletes. 
 Furthermore, people in the United States are presumed innocent until proven guilty.  
Although the “presumption of innocence is not found explicitly in the Constitution, its 
articulation is an essential component of a fair trial.”99 The state is charged with proving the 
accused has committed a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.100 At the civil level, the standard is a 
preponderance of the evidence, but liability must still be proven and is not assumed.101 However, 
the WADC does not have such a presumption and the burden is on the athlete to prove their 
                                                 
97 Olympic Movement Protocol, supra note 50, at 18.  
98 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
99 William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 329, 339 (2005). 
100 Id. at 390. 
101 Cornell University Law School, Legal Information Institute, (2015), located at 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preponderance. (Last accessed October 6, 2015.) 
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innocence.102 What the WADC fails to consider is that “definitive proof of factual innocence [i]s 
too much of a burden for mortals to bear.”103 If the policies and procedures followed by USADA 
and other entities operating doping hearings on a guilty until proven innocent standard were 
considered government agents or actors, than such a standard could violate due process criteria.   
V. Actual Effect of the Convention 
 The adoption of the Convention appears to have had no impact on sports doping in the 
United States. Since its adoption, no federal legislation regarding sports doping has been passed. 
Leagues have altered their doping programs, generally to add HGH and other specific substances 
as well as doping and testing methods.104 However, none of these doping policies rises to the 
severity of the WADC in either the number of banned substances or the severity of punishments. 
So how do we know that that United States has not altered its overall regulation of doping in 
sports in specifically due to the Convention? 
A. The Conference of Parties 
1. Representatives 
The United States has attended every bi-annual Conference of Parties for the Convention 
since 2009, the first conference after the United States became a signatory.105 But mere 
attendance does not mean that United States has seriously engaged with the Convention or the 
Conference of Parties.  
                                                 
102 WADC, supra note 96, at art. 3.2.1-3.2.2, and 3.2.1 Comment. 
103 LAUFER, supra note 99, at 332. 
104 See NFL/NFLPA Drug Policies; NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement; MLB/MLBPA Joint Drug Agreement; 
NHL/NHLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 66. 
105 Conference of Parties to the International Convention against Doping Sport, Second Session Draft Final Report 
(2009), located at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002137/213751e.pdf [Hereinafter 2CP Final Report]; 
Conference of Parties to the International Convention against Doping in Sport, Fourth Session Final Report (2013), 
located at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002280/228091e.pdf [Hereinafter 4CP Final Report]. (Both last 
accessed September 10, 2015). There is no public final report for the Third Session (3CP).  
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The known representatives that the United States has sent to the Conference of Parties 
have not all been members of the American anti-doping world. Some were not even members of 
the sports world. In 2009 the United States sent three people, Edward Jurith, Michael Gottlieb, 
and Carolyn Willson.106 Mr. Jurith has a history in drug regulation, having served as the Acting 
Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in 2001 and again in 2009.107 
He was an attorney with the ONDCP from 1994 until 2009.108 Mr. Gottlieb also works at the 
ONDCP, and sits on the WADA’s Foundation Board, Executive Committee, and Finance and 
Administration Committee.109 Ms. Willson was a legal advisor for the U.S. Mission to UNESCO, 
a part of the United States Embassy.110 This group had legal expertise involving drugs and 
doping in general and in sports, as well as diplomacy, and sending them gave an indication that 
the United States was serious about its involvement with the Convention.  
Documentation does not reveal whom the United States sent as representatives in 2011. 
However, in 2013 the United States’ representatives were Janel Heird and James Grizzle.111 Both 
of these representatives were with the U.S. Mission to UNESCO: Ms. Heird was an 
administrator112 and Mr. Grizzle was an Education Officer.113 In 2015 the United States did not 
send a delegation to the Conference of Parties at all.114 This was a significant change from the 
                                                 
106 2CP Final Report, supra note 105, at 36.  
107 Eric E. Sterling, Edward H. Jurith, 1951- 2013, Attorney, White House Drug Policy Leader (2013), located at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-e-sterling/edward-h-jurith-1951--201_b_4318123.html. (Last accessed 
September 10, 2015.) 
108 Id. (this information was not listed in this article) 
109 The WADA Interview – Michael K. Gottlieb (2015), located at https://www.wada-ama.org/en/media/news/2015-
08/the-wada-interview-michael-k-gottlieb (Last accessed September 10, 2015.) 
110 Carolyn Willson LinkedIn page (2015), located at https://www.linkedin.com/in/carolyn-willson-b496a235/ ). 
(Last accessed September 10, 2015.) 
111 4CP, supra note 105, at 37. 
112 Id.; US Embassy in Banjul gets New Public Affairs Officer (2015), located at 
http://gambiaoneradio.com/?article=1725. This link does not work anymore (Last accessed September 10, 2015.)  
113 US Permanent Delegation to UNESCO (2013), located at http://unescoeducation.blogspot.com/2013/07/us-
permanent-delegation-to-unesco.html. (Last accessed September 10, 2015.) 
114 Conference of Parties to the International Convention against Doping Sport, Fifth Session Draft Final Report 
(2015), located at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002458/245802E.pdf [Hereinafter 5CP Final Report]. 
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delegation sent six years earlier. The failure to continue to consistently send representatives 
specifically from the doping and sports spheres, or any representatives at all, raises questions as 
to the United States’ commitment fulfilling to the Convention. 
2. Elected Offices and Committees 
The United States has never held any elected position related to the Convention. These 
positions include the chairperson, four vice-chairpersons, rapporteur, and members of the 
Approval Committee for the Fund for the Elimination of Doping in Sport.115 Why the United 
States has never held any of these positions is unknown, but not sending delegate or sending 
delegates whose primary interest and expertise is not in sport and/or doping may well be a factor. 
As a result, the United States is not involved the governance and administration of the 
Conference of Parties or the Convention. 
B. United States Compliance with the Convention 
Based on the Reports of States Parties on Measures Taken by Them for the Purpose of 
Complying with the International Convention against Doping in Sport (Reports of Parties) the 
United States is mostly in compliance with the Convention, and that compliance level has 
increased in recent years.116 The Reports of Parties are self-reports submitted by each signatory 
where they answer a variety of questions related to compliance with the Convention.  
The individual Reports of Parties are not available until the third Conference of Parties in 
2011. At that time the United States was 78.6% compliant answers, 7.1% non-compliant 
                                                 
115 ICDS/1CP/Doc. 1 (2006), located at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001494/149487e.pdf. (Last accessed 
September 10, 2015.) 
116 Reports of States Parties on Measures Taken by Them for the Purpose of Complying with the International 
Convention against Doping in Sport (2015), located at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002344/234470E.pdf 
(Last accessed November 3, 2016.) [Hereinafter 5CP Report of Parties.] 
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answers, and 14.3% do not know answers.117 Two years later the United States percentages were 
unchanged.118 However, the 2015 Report of Parties showed compliance levels from the 2009, 
2011, and 2013 reports, providing information on changes in compliance in many areas.119 The 
89.3% compliance rate in 2015 was a notable increase over the 78.6% compliance rate the 
United States had in prior years and is deemed acceptable by the Convention.120 It is also similar 
to many of the other top Olympic competitors who had compliance rates higher than the United 
States: Australia: 96.4%; China: 85.7%; Russia: 85.7%; and the United Kingdom: 85.7%.121 
There are four categories in the Report of Parties, each with various sub-categories: 
National Activities to Strengthen Anti-doping  
Article 8: Prohibited Substances and Methods  
Article 9: Athlete Support Personnel  
Article 10: Nutritional Supplements  
Article 11: Financial Measures  
Article 12: Doping Control  
International Cooperation  
Article 13: Cooperation between Organizations  
Article 16: Cooperation in Doping Control  
Education and Training  
Article 19: General Education and Training  
Article 20: Professional Codes of Conduct  
Article 21: Involvement of Athletes and Athlete and Support Personnel  
Article 22: Ongoing Education and Training  
Article 23: Cooperation in Education and Training  
Research 
Article 24: Promotion of Research  
Article 25: Nature of research  
Article 26: Sharing Research  
Article 27: Sports science.122 
 
                                                 
117 Reports of States Parties on Measures Taken by Them for the Purpose of Complying with the International 
Convention against Doping in Sport,, located at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002137/213762e.pdf. (Last 
accessed September 10, 2015.) [Hereinafter 3CP Report of Parties.] 
118 4CP Report of Parties, supra note 72. 
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 There are five levels of compliance, ranging from Limited Compliance (Level 1) to High 
Compliance (Level 5).123 The United States has been at the Level 5 compliance since 2009 for 
the following Articles: 8, 13, 16, 21, 23, 24 and 26.124 Article 22 has been Level 2 throughout all 
four reports.125 Article 22 directs that “…Parties shall encourage sports organizations and anti-
doping organizations to implement ongoing education and training programmes for all athletes 
and athlete support personnel on the subjects identified in Article 19.”126 Apparently, the United 
States is not doing this to a satisfactory level. At no time has the United States had an article at 
Level 1 and only twice has any article appeared at Level 3.127  
 The following articles have changed their compliance levels over time: 9, 11, 12, 20, 25, 
and 27. These changes warrant further examination. 
Article 9: Athlete Support Personal: This article directs members to “take measures or 
encourage sports organizations and anti-doping organizations to adopt measures, including 
sanctions or penalties, aimed at athlete support personnel who commit an anti-doping rule 
violation or other offence connected with doping in sport.”128 The United States was Level 5 
compliant in 2009, dropped to Level 2 in 2011, and was back up to Level 5 in 2013 and has 
remained there.129 The reasons for these changes are unclear.  
Article 10: Nutritional Supplements: This article addresses nutritional supplements130 and 
given that the United States has had virtually no regulations regarding nutritional supplements, it 
is not surprising that this article has had a historically low compliance level. However, in 2015, 
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127 Id. 
128 Convention, supra note 2, at Art. 9. 
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the United States increased to Level 5 compliance in this area.131 The United States has not 
passed any laws regarding the regulation of nutritional supplements since 1994132 and without 
knowing what questions the self-report asks, it is unclear what caused this increase in 
compliance level.   
Article 11: Financial Measures: This articles states that, where appropriate, members 
should:  
(a) provide funding within their respective budgets to support a national testing 
programme across all sports or assist sports organizations and anti-doping organizations 
in financing doping controls either by direct subsidies or grants, or by recognizing the 
costs of such controls when determining the overall subsidies or grants to be awarded to 
those organizations;  
(b) take steps to withhold sport-related financial support to individual athletes or athlete 
support personnel who have been suspended following an anti-doping rule violation, 
during the period of their suspension;  
(c) withhold some or all financial or other sport-related support from any sports 
organization or anti-doping organization not in compliance with the Code or applicable 
anti-doping rules adopted pursuant to the Code.133  
 
The United States was Level 2 in 2009 and 2011, moving up to Level 3 in 2013, and 
finally Level 5 in 2015.134 The United States low level of compliance for this article makes sense 
because the United States does not fund sports in any way at the national level. As discussed 
previously, USADA and USOC are private entities and do not receive substantial government 
funding. This increase is likely due to increased funding for testing being provided by private 
entities, such as professional sport leagues and USADA.  
Article 12: Doping Control: This article directs members to: 
(a) encourage and facilitate the implementation by sports organizations and anti-doping 
organizations within their jurisdiction of doping controls in a manner consistent with the 
Code, including no-advance notice, out-of-competition and in-competition testing;  
(b) encourage and facilitate the negotiation by sports organizations and anti-doping 
organizations of agreements permitting their members to be tested by duly authorized 
                                                 
131 Id. 
132 Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, 21 U.S.C. § 9 (1994).  
133 Convention, supra note 2, at Art. 11. 
134 5CP Report of Parties, supra note 116. 
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doping control teams from other countries;  
(c) undertake to assist the sports organizations and anti-doping organizations within their 
jurisdiction in gaining access to an accredited doping control laboratory for the purposes 
of doping control analysis.135  
 
The United States appears to be doing well in this area, as it was Level 4 in 2009, but has 
been Level 5 since 2011.136 
Article 19: General Education and Training: This article is concerned with education and 
training related to the anti-doping policies and activities.137 The United States had been at Level 
4 from 2009 to 2013, but increased to Level 5 in 2015.138 
Article 20: Professional Codes of Conduct: This article states that “... Parties shall 
encourage relevant competent professional associations and institutions to develop and 
implement appropriate codes of conduct, good practice and ethics related to anti-doping in sport 
that are consistent with the Code.”139  
The United States was Level 2 in 2009, jumped to Level 5 in 2011, and fell back down to 
Level 2 in 2013, and was then back to Level 5 in 2015.140 The reason for this inconsistency is 
unclear, however it may well have to do with changes in the doping policies of private sports 
entities, such as professional leagues and USADA. Due the constitutional concerns raised prior, 
the United States government cannot just direct professional leagues and other sport 
organizations as to what their doping policies should be, as that could open those entities up to 
being state actors, raising 4th Amendment problems, but if those entities make these changes of 
their own accord, that would improve the United States’ overall compliance. It is surprising that 
the United States meets Level 5 compliance however, since the policies of the professional 
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leagues and that NCAA do not meet WADC criteria and thus they do not meet the standards of 
the Convention.141 
Article 25: Nature of Research: Per this article, “[w]hen promoting anti-doping research, 
as set out in Article 24, States Parties shall ensure that such research will: (a) comply with 
internationally recognized ethical practices; (b) avoid the administration to athletes of prohibited 
substances and methods; (c) be undertaken only with adequate precautions in place to prevent the 
results of anti-doping research being misused and applied for doping.”142   
Again, the United States was Level 2 in 2009, jumped to Level 5 in 2011, and then fell 
back down to Level 2 in 2013 and has remained there.143 The reasons for this are likely similar to 
those for Article 20. Most doping research in the United States is conducted by private entities 
not the government and a fair amount of private research appears to be toward coming up with 
new methods of doping. Also, due to professional league and NCAA policies not being to the 
standard of WADA, the United States may not be viewed as sufficiently avoiding administration 
to athletes. 
Article 27: Sports science: This final article requires that member encourage “(a) 
members of the scientific and medical communities to carry out sport science research in 
accordance with the principles of the Code; (b) sports organizations and athlete support 
personnel within their jurisdiction to implement sport science research that is consistent with the 
principles of the Code.”144  
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The United States was Level 5 in 2009 and 2011, fell to Level 3 in 2013, and returned to 
Level 5 in 2015.145 It is not clear why the United States fell and then regained its compliance in 
this category, but the reasons may be similar to those for Article 25. Additionally, the United 
States may not do significant research on some drugs, such as steroids, due to their generally 
illegal status. Continued Level 5 compliance may be challenging for the United States in the 
future. 
V. Conclusion 
 In spite of the United States’ lack of involvement with the Conference of Parties, it 
appears that the United States is significantly compliant with the Convention. However, the 
United States knew that it would not be able to fully comply with the all the terms of the 
Convention, which raises the question of whether the signing of the Convention was done more 
for appearance sake. The timing of the signing (just after the Mitchell Report), the lack of 
improvement in compliance or in taking affirmative actions to comply, the change in who we 
send as representatives all indicate that perhaps this is the case. Additionally, the inability to 
comply with the Convention may raise concerns about the United States’ credibility in regard to 
anti-doping in the eyes of the international community.   
It is unlikely that the United States will be able to achieve complete compliance due to 
the private nature of the sports industry at the highest levels and the lack of government funding 
and federal legislation directed towards doping prevention. Too much government involvement 
could lead to those entities becoming state actors, which would mean that they would have to 
abide by constitutional protections. As it stands, the United States Constitution prevents full 
compliance with the International Convention against Doping in Sport unless the individual sport 
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entities decide themselves to enact policies that comply with the Convention, a move that seems 
unlikely in the foreseeable future.  
 
